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does the relativity of moral standards lead only to scepticism 
and pessimism? 
Having determined something of the nature of ethics 
itself, we shall turn to its relation with other fields. To 
what extent is ethics dependent upon the descriptive sciences 
of sociology and psychology for its data, and what is the 
nature of the data it derives from these fields? What re-
lation does ethics bear to the other normative sciences? 
Does the moral hold control over the aesthetic, or is each 
autonomous? 
of religion? 
How is ethical science related to the philosophy 
Can they be said ever to clash? Which of the 
two is the more fundamental? 
The matter of the relations of other sciences to 
ethics introduces perhaps the most fundamental question of 
all. To what extent may ethics be said to be independent 
of metaphysics? 
in metaphysics? 
Can there be a valid ethics without a basis 
Can the moral agent be rationally considered 
without some reference to his metaphysical status? Equally 
important, what is the relation of moral freedom to meta-
physical freedom? In what sense can the latter be said to 
exist? Concerning social philosophy, it may be asked how 
ethical theory is affected by its relation to democracy, 
communism, and fascism; whether communism or capitalism pro-
vides the best opportunities for the -realization of ideal 
values through self development, whether a synthesis of the 
ideas of both would be feasible or advantageous? 
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Lastly we take up the question as to the applica-
tions of ethics. In its application to political science, 
what is the ethical principle involved in an individual's 
yielding to the will of the majority in a democratic govern-
ment? Is it necessary for him to obey even in the case of 
going to war? What are the ethical bases of pacifism .. , .~. · 
of international law, of nationalism? With respect to the 
application of ethics to economics we are chiefly concerned 
with whether economic science holds a place for moral value. 
In regard to the application of ethics to legal institutions 
we shall consider whether the chief factor involved is the 
bare logical consistency of the law itself or the probable 
consequences of a given legal decision in the lives of the 
persons affected. To what extent may the law be considered 
an effective instrument for the promotion of morality? In 
the matter of the application of ethics to education, what 
educational method best aids the student in realizing the 
maximum number of values? It is with vital problems such as 
these that this thesis is intended to deal. In a word, what 
is the nature of contemporary ethical thinking and what is 
its relation to other branches of life and thought? 
2. Method of Treatment. 
Our method consists in going to what may be con-
sidered the best available source for the expression of 
current ethical thought, the International Journal of Ethics, 
======= ===================-
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Sircar in his article on •tsocial and Moral Ideas in the 
Upanishads" 3has this to say on the place of ethics in Himu-
ism. 
The Upanishads do not ignore ethical and 
social problems. But greater stress has 
been laid on the realization o:f undecaying 
bliss •••• Codes of duties, adjustment o:f 
rights, are neatly :formulated in the Upan-
ishads, but they do not form the chief prob-
lem. The chief problem has been to :find 
out the summum bonum. 4 
With respect to personality the articles on Hindu 
thought are not in complete agreement. The view o:f Tagore 
as depicted by Percy T. Fenn in "An Indian Poet Looks at the 
Westn5 is expressed in these words: nReali ty remains today 
what it always has been and what it ever will be, the ex-
pression of personality.'t6 According to D. M. Datta in 
''The Moral Conception of Nature in Irxlian Philosophy , 11 7 
"All I ndia!Il schools conceive nature as the stage :for moral 
8 beings constituted and guided by moral needs.n In the 
'tMeaning of Caste to the Hindus , 119 Leidecker uses these 
glowing words with respect to the caste system. "It is 
difficult :for the Westerner to imagine that the whole struc-
ture o:f society may be based on a philosophic conception o:f 
personality. 11 10 On the other hand we :fim in these articles 
3. Sircar , Int. Jour. o:f Eth., 44 (1933) ,. 94-105. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
. 7. 
Ibid., 94. 
Fenn, Int. Jour. o:f E.th., 39 (1929), 313-323. 
Ibid.' 320. 
Datta, Int. Jour. o:f Eth., 46 (1936), 223-228. 
Ibid.' 223. 
Leidecker, Int. Jour. o:f Eth., 43 (1933), 183-193. 
Ibid., 186. 
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a few such obscure remarks as the following by Sircar~ 
11Life becomes more than personality and the stream of life 
i n its perpetuity is left to be unceasingly creative of 
11 beauties, symmetry , harmony . n 
I 
I 
I n connection with the Hindu conception of personal- ! 
ity it is interesting to note that the concept of t ransmigra- \ 
tion or reincarnation of souls appears in virtually every 
article . According t o Sarma , ttper:fection is not attained 
in a single life •••• Countless lives will have to be gone 
12 t hrough before perfection can be attained. " In the words 
of Leidecker: I 
7 
----
Every person representing a bundle of experi-
ence is , according to Hindus , born agai n and 
again while the circumstances of his bi rth 
are ~onditi~ged by t he experience heap ed up 
prev1ously . 
I -
Thus the caste system derives its ultimate justification from 
the transmigration of souls. Vfuatever caste a man be ongs 
to is but the outcome of his conduct in some previous in-
car nation. 
ie now t urn to a discussion of the Hindu vi ew con-
cerni ng several other r ather important ethical concepts. 
~Vhat for the Hi ndu constitutes moral goodness? According 
1 · t o Sanna, "Morality means and implies a harmoni ous synthesis 
I 14 
among thoughts, words , and deeds of a person. " According 
11. Sii'Q_ . ~ , loc . cit. , 103. 
12 . Sarma ~ I nt. Jour. of Eth., 40 (1929), 71. 
13. Leidecker, loc . cit., 189~ 
14. Sarma, ~. d't·, 69. 

through the course of centuries . Especially does this appear 
true with respect to reincarnation and caste. 
2 • Socrates • 
Three rather import ant articles on the subj ect of 
Socrates form the basis of this treatment. The firstt in the 
:form o:f a discussion by Sarah H. Brown, is entitled "Socratic 
Method and Aristotle's Definition of t he Good . 1118 The author 
:finds three elements in the method of Socrates: 11 Right 
opinion , criteria, and definatory hypotheses . "19 By far the 
most interesting point in the discussion , however, lies in 
the author ' s treatment of a dilemma involved in this method & 
1 According to So.crates ' doctrine of reminiscence, knowledge 
'i 
I 
II II 
consists in recognizing factors which i n a sense we already 
know. Thus arises the paradox that : 
Learning implies both knowledge and ignorance 
of the same things ; that a man must both know 
and not know these things at the same time; 
for he must know already in order to be able 
to recognize t he truth when he sees it, and 
he must al so not know or what has he to gain 
by learning?20 
To be of value this theory must show a definite 
differentiation between these two meanings of knowledge. 
The sense in which we already know the author designates as 
'right opinion,' and the sense in which we come to know as 
18. Brown, Int. Jour. of Et h., 43 (1933) , 329-338. 
19. Ibid. ' 329. 
20. Ibid. 
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'definition. ' 
Right opinion is different from the defin-
ition in the sense that in the right opinion 
the form and content are functionally united, 
the content being determinate and the form 
regulative; whereas i n the definition the 
form and content are exhibited in separation, 
the form being determinate and the content 
being merely referential. Hence, since there 
is a difference , there is something to be 
gained by exhibiting the analysis of right 
opinion .21 
A somewhat more striking article is that by Gustav 
Mueller entitled 11Another Approach to Socrates . 11 22 After 
criticizing as too limited the representations of Socrates 
by Xenophon, Aristophanes , Antisthenes, Aristippus , and 
Aristotle, the author says : 
I f we had no Plato we only would have these 
contradictory Socrateses . We might try to 
put them together, and the result woul d approx-
imate what we already have in Plato. Plato ' s 
early so-called Socratic dialogues cont ain 
all these sides and more.23 
After he has enumerated a number of conflicting traits withi n 
the character of Socrates, Mueller remarks that : 
We see here a rounded and concrete personal-
ity, a concrete whole and not an additive 
aggregate, a unity of these opposites and 
not a patched up eclecticism. • • • He be-
comes the magnetic pole in which all opposites 
meet, and thus he becomes the dialectical 
unity of opposites as the problem of man.24 
21. Brova1, loc. cit., 330. 
22. Mueller, Int . Jour l of Eth. , 43 (1933), 429-439. 
23. Ibid . ' 432. 
24 . Ibi d • ' 432-433 . 
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Dialect ic, the facing of obstacles in the thinking 
process, the certainty that everything is uncertain: this is 
seen as the essence of Socratic thought. nphilosophy is 
nothing but to 'know thyself. '' And in Socrates it. becomes 
the l iving soul and unity a:f human reality . "·25 This 
daimonion or inner vo ice o:f Socrates by its constant and 
consistent negation point.s to ''A norm o:f absolute ••• cer-
tainty against. which the whole human sphere is criticized . 1126. 
In the article previously discussed ~ we found an 
epi stemological paradox o:f Socrates resolved .. Here there is 
I introduced another Socratic paradox of a more ethical nature. \ 
"Man t s wisdom is ignorance , but man ' s virtue is knowledge. " ·I 
The source of this paradox lies in the psychology of the 
Sophists, whose truth rested in the i r emphasis upon moral 
autonomy and their insistence upon the ethical :freedom of 
the individual from external authority. Socrates went be-
yond them in recognizing the reality of an ultimate rational 
end, of a moral law which commands one's loyalty . In this 
way Socrates is shown to anticipate the Kantian formulation. 
Unify experience in such a way that the maxim 
of your acti on might become the moral law -
thi s Kantian f ormul ation of ethics is the 
Socratic :formulation too (Cr i to 50 :f.; Mem . iv. 
4. 1.6 .) An::l it implies like the Kantian that 
every man ought to be regarded , potentially, 
at leas t , as an end in itself and not only as 
25 . Mueller, loc. cit ., 434. 
26. illQ.. ' 435. 
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:factor~ the transcendent principle o:f reason. Whitby 
stresses only the former o:f these views , and hence there 
is in his treatment slight distincti on between Socrates 
and the Sophists. 
The sociological teaching of Socrates can 
be summarized by the statement ~ '·Justice is 
minding one 's own business. t This means 
personal responsibility :for ethical self-
development and no presumptive interference 
in the development o:f others.30 
Furthermore, ·whenever Whitby finds evi dence in 
Socrates for the direction of personality by the rational 
element, he discounts it as a defect o:f the Socratic theory. 
Such a tendency is to be :found in the :following passage. 
In the Republic reasoning seems to be re-
garded as a faculty over and above the 
passions , ani i s frequently referred to as 
the 'love of truth. ,. I ts function i s to 
direct the passions to their true objectives. 
The postulate o:f a dominating faculty is not 
supported by empirical evidence o:f _any kind~31 
The a~ of \Vhitby s eems to be as much to preach an 
individuali stic and relativistic ethics for the present day 
as to present a historical analysis of the Socratic system. 
A certain phase of Socratic thought is chosen as a text upon 
which to base this modern polemic . Yet , especially in his 
treatment of the passions , it would seem that Whitby would 
have better turned to Hume than to Socrates for support . 
Nevertheless it may be said that these three arti cles 
30. Whitby, loc. cit ., 195 . 
31 . Ibid., 196. 
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this decadence is not u l t imat e, since it "results f rom a 
tempor ar y triumph of irrational chaotic forces over t he 
rational principle in some particular society. n35 
He criticized the present social order for 
the absence of praiseworthy virtues discoverable 
in an older coPdition to emphasize the desirabil-
ity of recovering these virtues in a pseudo-
Hegelian synthesis.36 
Not only, as Bassett well shows , does Plato strongly 
believe in the reality of soc i a l progress, but he supports 
this belief by a metaphysical. basis. 
The world-soul ceaselessly augments order in 
the chaos-tending universe . Similarly, the 
human reason, a derivative of the world-soul, 
by nature orders the material and social en-
vironment. Plato, therefore, considers social 
progress inevitablea ••• From a cosmological 
p erspective progress is continuous; it tends 
to be so in a given society ; and there can be 
no doubt of the eventual progress of all 
societies. The philosopher, being an agent 
of the world-soul • • • must strive increasing-
ly to order society , that is, guide it toward 
the ideal.37 
On a distinctly lower plane than Bassett ' s scholarly 
treatment is the discussi on by Alburey Castell entitl ed 
ttplato as a Social Refonner." 38 It consists in an attempt 
to justify Plato's c·ri tic ism of the Athenian conditions of 
his day. 
35 . Bassett, loc. cit. , 476. 
36. Ibid ., 470-471. 
37. Ibid., 475-476. 
38. Castell, Int. Jour. of Eth., 40 (1929) , 121-127. 
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-i Plato is critical all down the line. 
Politics - too democratic; education - too 
slipshod; religion - too immoral; marriage -
too dysgenic; :family li.:fe - too narrow. 
Nothing in his home town seems to have met 
with his approval •••• It may be profitabl e 
to try to picture conditions :for ourselves, 
and discover how many o:f us would have voted 
with Plato.39 
From this Castell goes on to study in some detail the con-
ditions which met with Plato 's denunciation, picturing :for 
us the incompetent Athenian assembly , the unwieldy and ir-
responsible Popular Supreme Court , the superficial education 
provided by the Sophists , the restricted position held by 
women. These evils, Castell suggests, justified Plato in 
advocating all of his reforms including the community O.:f 
wives, children, and property; censorship of art and re-
ligion; and the dictatorship of the philosopher-king. 
Concerning the need of improving the Athenian 
1\ situation of Plato' s time, there can be little question. 
[
1 
Perhaps Castell's description of its evils is not overdrawn. 
Yet to justify Plato's methods o:f reform is virtually equival-
ent to saying that the end justifies the means . Rigid regi-
mentation of culture cannot be considered a permanently 
effective means o:f raising the standard of any society. Even 
though the dictator be a philosopher, the means of force and 
violence will contradict the best of aims and ideals. 
The third and last article concerning Plato which we 
39. Castell , loc. cit., 121-127. 
----="- - ---++---------·------- -
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shall discuss is that by Hans Kels~n entitled ''Platonic 
Justice. "4° Kelsen bases his treatment of Plato's concept 
of j ustice on a brief but rather penetrating analysis of the 
entire Platonic system . The author ' s first point deals in 
some detail with Plato's dualism, which he considers to be 
the most characteristic phase of his philosophy. 
The ethical dualism of good and evil is , as 
i t were , an inner ring which is enveloped by 
the dualism of epistemiology and onto logy 
which grew out of and beyom the ethical dual-
ism itself •••• The ethical maintains a place 
of unmistakably primary importance in the 
Platonic philosophy.41 
Just because the Platonic dualism grows out of the 
own moral experience. Perhaps at this point the author 
over-emphasizes the influence of the Eros or love of boys 
arrl its spiritual ization upon Plato's thought .. "What had 
originally split the Platonic world unites it once again. 
Eros produced the separation; Eros is responsible for the 
reunion. u42 Another factor which is shown to have greatly 
influenced Plato's thought was his strong political inter-
ests . nPlato was by temperament more a politician than a 
theorist. "43 In his political thinking he " is revealed less 
as a psychologist or a soci ologist concerned with social 
reality than as a preacher of justice •1144Plato ' s political 
40 . Kels en, Int .. Jour. of Eth. , 48 (1938), 367-400. 
41. Ibid. , 368. 
42. Ibid. , 376. 
43. Ibid., 377. 
44. ill5!· 
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Another factor which influenced Platots conception of 
justice was the principle of retribution brought about 
by means of successive reincarnations of the individual 
soul. This he derived mainly from Pythagoras. But through-
out the Republic he reaches no actual definition of justice. 
"Just. as one appears to have arrived at an answer to the 
question, the position attained is abandoned; the result 
obtained is withdrawn as inexact or erroneous, and the end 
is again postponed. tt48 The nature o.f justice is finally 
shown to. rest upon the concept of the good, but neither 
is this concept rationally defined. . 
The knowledge of the good does not follow 
as a logical. concl usion of the dialectical 
process; but it is an allotment of grace to 
the soul which has 'purified itself of all 
sensuality by meditation.49 
Kelsen concludes that Plato abandons himself to an aJmost 
completely mystical solution with respect to these ultimate 
problems of justice am the good. 
The Sophists had skeptically denied the ex-
istence of an absolute justice; Socrates had 
asserted it passionately and dogmatically, 
but was finally forced to confess that he 
did not know what. it really was . Plato de-
clares that one may attain this knowledge 
through his philosophy; but he also says that 
the result will be inexpressible,. that the. 
question will remain unanswered ,. indeed that 
the question is not even valid. Thus the road 
which was to lead from rationalistic relativism 
to the metaphysical absolute ends in religious 
mysticism.5D 
48. Kelsen, l oc. cit . , 394. 
49 . Ibid.' 396. 
50 . Ibid • ' 398 • 
That men will be satisfied with the answer 
of the Sophists is not likely. Men will con-
tinue to search out the religious road along 
which Plato struggled, even though it be the 
road of blood and tears.51 . 
4. Aristotle. 
Our treatment of Aristotle wi ll be confined to the 
discussion of a single article, the longest in the eleven: .. vol-
umes upon which this thesis is based . "The Philosophy of 
Aristotle and the Hellenic Macedonian Policy•t52by Hans Kelsen · 
occupies virtually an entire issue,. and imeed appears to be 
one of the most significant of all the historical articles. 
Though Aristotle ts once supreme influence as 
natural scientist and logician has disappeared, his Ethics 
and Politics are still factors to be :reekoned' with . As 
Kelsen says : 
Their influence upon the thought of our time 
can scarcely b e 0 <o-verestimated . Modern 
scientific treatments of the problems of a 
moral world-order and of a juridical state 
community still in very great measure betray 
the stamp of the Aristotelian system.53 
Since, however, the Ethics and Politics are so 
closely related to the Metaphysics, Kelsen gives a brief 
treatment of the latter. His remarks concerning Aristotle 's 
God are especially noteworthy. 
51. K.elsen, loc. cit ., 400. 
52. Kelsen , Int. Jour. of Eth., 48 (1938), 1-64. 
53. Ibid. ' 1. 
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The godhead which as a personal being exists 
neither in willing nor in doing but only in 
thinking is , according to Aristotle's descrip-
tion, in a state of 'joyous glory' or 'bliss.' 
• • • As the divine reason can only have the 
best as the object of its thought, that object 
can only be itself . What it is important to 
notice is that the question as to the essence 
of the good remains unanswered and being un-
answerable is pushed aside . Aristotle proves 
himself in his Metaphysics j ust as Plato has 
done in his Politica, unable to give a material 
answer to the decisive question. Like Plato 
he is satisfied by affirming that an absolute 
good exists . I n what it consists he cannot. 
say.54 
Though it is developed in a detailed and scholarly 
manner, the essential thought of this article may be 
indicated briefly. In his Politics Aristotle is at some 
pains to demonstrate that monarchy is the best. form o-r 
government. Yet a moderate form of democracy called polity 
also meets with hi s approval. Since polity results in rule 
by the middle class , Aristotle calls to its support his 
Mesotes formula or doctrine of the mean. How is it possible 
to reconcile Aristotle ts approval of monarchy with his sup-
port of democracy? According to Kelsen , the solution lies 
in the political environment in whi ch he wrote .. The 
Macedonian Empire held an external protectorate over the 
league of Greek city-states . Both Philip and Alexander 
desired these cities to continue running their internal 
affairs according to their established democratic method. 
"The monarchy did not des i re to take the place of the 
54. Kelsen, loc. cit., 3-4. 
-----=-~============= 
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There~ore, we see how much mor e realistic was the 
Aristotelian political theory than the Platonic. In f ace 
of the. encroaching Macedonian imperialism Plato presented 
an unrealizable Utopia; Aristotle, on the other hand, at-
tempts an empirical s olution. 
Plato wishes to give to philosophy , i.e ., to 
his own philosophy instead o~ to democracy , 
the place of ruler; his theory of government 
has, from the point of view of practical 
politics, absolutely no, or, at most, a purely 
negative significance . It is but a symptom 
of the decline already begun o~ the Polis 
constitution. Very different is the 
Aristotelian, in which the real power of 
the state is already clearly announced, the 
far-reaching e~~ects of which were destined 
to give to antiquity its political stamp.56 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Surely Kelsen has presented a striking parallel be- II 
tween the political situation o~ Aristotle's day and the 
character of his Metaphysics and Politics. Whether the 
direct influence of the one upon the other is as great as 
he believes provides at least a stimulating problem. 
5. Hedonism. 
I t is perhaps true that the weaker an ethical 
theory is, the more competent is the mi nd needed to de~end 
it. This may explain the ~act that the articles concerning 
Hedonism in the International Journal of Ethics are written 
in most instances by truly acute thinkers. Four complete 
articles support the Hedonistic position, three attack it. 
56. Kelsen, loc. cit .. , 64. 
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It is important to note that in no case is it 
strictly the historic position of Hedonism that is being 
defended. For instance , R. M. Blake remarks , 
By hedoni sm I do not mean Epicureanism , or 
Benthamism, or the doctrines of J . s. Mill. 
There is not the s lightest difficulty, and 
it has in fact been demonstrated ad nauseam , 
that these historic theories are one and all 
infected with serious fallacies and gross 
errors .57 
It is by thus r epudiating the classic Hedonism that 
these modern Hedonists attempt to escape t he charges made 
against t he historical fo rms. Whether they succeed in so 
doing determines their success or failure in establishing 
their theses. 
The writers are in general agreement t hat Hedonism 
cannot be proved . In the words of Blake : 
Let us admit at once that the fundamental 
principles of hedonism are incapable of 
demonstrati on. So far as I can see , the 
critics are quite right in reflecting all 
the alleged proofs that have been offered , 
am I know of nothing that can be set i n 
their place .58 
According to Savery , nNone of the attempts to prove Hedon-
ism has succeeded; so I shall make a present of them to the 
enemy .n59 
I n answer to this i nability to prove their theory 
these Hedonists point to a similar weakness in all other 
ethical systems. They likewise claim that many of the other 
57 . Blake , I nt . Jour. of Eth .. , 39 (1928), 93-101. 
58 . Ibid . , 14. 
59. ~-~~y , I nt. Jour. of Eth., 45 (1934), 9. ____ _ 
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attempts t o ext r icate himself from the position to which 
Wild has driven him . 
I acknowledge that , as Mr . Wi ld argues , a 
hedoni st i s commi tt.ed to the view that for 
a man to desire pleasure i s neither im-
possible nor unnatural. · Now I do not in 
the least know why Mr. Wild chooses to 
describe the latt er doctrine as psycholog-
ical hedonism.66 
Although Mr. Bl ake ' s accompanying arguments are brilliant, 
they are not wholly convincing, and Wild seems essentially 
correct in his final answering article when he says , "I have 
been unable to di scover j ust where Mr . Blake comes to grips 
with the questi on which I had in mind .n67 Certainly the 
question of psychol ogical Hedonism is a vi tal one. t' ild is 
correct in pointing t o it as the inevitable stumbling block 
of the modern Hedonist . I n a l l probabili ty ild is correct 
in his conclusion that it is impossi bl e for Hedonists to es- 1 
cape something akin to Hum.ian or Ti tchenerian psychol ogy. 
Blake claims to agree with \fild i n condemning such a 
psychology , but ild ' s refutation reaches its high point 
in the following statement: 
If he real ly does agree with me, ~w. Blake 
follows Aristotle, Butler , Green , Bradley , 
etc ., in maintai ning that the obj ects of 
man ' s desires are in no way restricted to 
his mental states, but that they range all 
66. Blake , I nt. Jour . of Eth., 39 (1928), 94 . 
67. Wild , I nt. Jour . of Eth. , 39 (1928) , 102. 
the way from so-called material objects to 
other people's mental states, and transcend-
ent universals. This being the case, there 
is no particular reason, so far as human 
nature is concerned , for being a hedonist, 
since the desire for pleasure plays no 
particular r6le arrwng the many dynamic 
tendencies ~hat bind the individual to 
his world .6 
Nor does Mahan successfully refUte this by claim-
ing that the denial of mental states "spells death to such 
things as desires, purposes , activities , ends , goals, ideals 
and judgments. n69 For it is not mental. states in themselves 
to which Wild objects, but rather on the one hand to Titchen-
er "s structural analysis of mental states and on the other 
to the idea that the objects of a mants desires are in any 
way restricted to his mental states. 
Among other weaknesses of the articles supporting 
Hedonism is their difficulty in giving a satisfactory explan-
ation of the Hedonist attitude toward egoism and altruism~ 
and their ambiguous treatment of whether qualitative or 
merely quantitative differences should be recogniz.ed between 
pleasures. In respect to this latter difficulty it should 
be said that~ although these modern writers are not eager to 
II 
be identified with the classical Hedonists, they nevertheless I' 
make some attempt to defend them . Savery especially makes 
a list of the historic illustrations, beginning with Socrates 
28 
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68. \Yild , loc. cit •• 103 . 
69. Mahan, loc. cit., 410. 
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and the pig ,. doing his utmost to uphold the Hedonistic 
position in each case .. Though the attempt embodied in these 
articles favoring Hedonism is a brilliant one , it nevertheless I 
:fails to achieve its purpose . Wild is r ight. Hedonism is 1 
psychologically and ethically outworn, unable to meet the 
conditions of modern life and thought. 
a Savery, or a Mahan can show otherwise. 
Not even a Blake, 
6 . Christian Elements : Jesus , Saint Augu.stine . 
The single important artic le on Jesus takes the form 
o:f a discussion entitl ed nThe Present florth of Jesus" by 
Bernard E. Meland. This author first calls attention to the 
indisputable evidence of a breakdown of authority, or better, 
of the authoritarian viewpoint, which he speaks of' as ,.The 
ref'usal to yield with uncritical loyalty to authorities that 
assume absoluteness a priori ."70 MelaiXi goes on to point 
out how this spirit applies to the modern conception o:f 
Jesus.71 The authoritarian view of' the Bible having been 
forcibly abandoned because of' scientific criticism, its 
adherents have turned to an authoritarian view of' Jesus . 
Not the Bible per se but the Bible per 
Chris t is the liberal 's gospel . Thus it is 
that liberal Christianity as reflected by 
the modern pulpit frees rel igious :faith and 
ethics :from biblical dogmatism only to re-
~erse it in a newer dogmatism . 72 
70 . Meland, Int. Jour. o:f Eth., 42 (1932) ., 324-330. 
71. Ibid., 324. 
II 72 .. Ibid.' 326. 
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recognition of the importance of the will. In his ethics, 
therefore, he tended to put mor e stress on the character of 
the will than upon the outward act . Finally Spencer at-
tempts some explanation of Augustine ' s treatment of freedom 
and determinism. His supreme emphasis of the individual 
mind and of the individual will would naturally have led to 
a belief in freedom. Yet the consciousness of the factor 
of grace in his own salvation l ed hi~ into logical inconsist-
ency. 
The oscillation between emphasis on the freedom 
of human action and emphasis on the determina-
tion of all action by God is due to the presence 
of two contrary impulsions in the religious life. 
Hence the attempt to work out a philosophy which 
does justice to all religious motives, as well 
as to questions of fact, results in the attempt 
to reconcile the principle of freedom with the 
princip~e of determinism. St. Augustine ' s 
solution is not satisfactory , but the attempt 
to reconcile these two principles has character-
ized all later phi l osophical thought.84 
Spencer ' s article would seem to be a true contribution 
to the literature concerning Augustine, and to religion and 
philosophy. Spencer ' s point is well taken. Religion need I 
not be a barrier to philosophical progress as it was duri ng a ! 
I part of the mediaeval period. Rather it may be a stimulus to 
genuine philosophical discovery as with St . Augustine. If the 
j article has a fault, it is the author ' s dependence upon second-
\! 
I 
ary sources. There are too many quotations from Windelhand and 
Wi l liam James, too few from St. Augustine. 
I 84. Spencer , loc. cit., 479. 
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he was motivated neither by extreme self-interest nor extreme 
altruism , but by an intense desire for efficiency as suche 
His was an intellectual rather than a moral 
passion, an interest in political effective-
ness rather than a sympathy with the results 
to be produced.87 
In rescuing the nation from chaos , Machiavelli believed it 
necessary t o abandon certain of the forms of freedom as a 
means to preserving some of its content . In his view ,. 
ttA strong governnent is at least the f i rst essential f'or 
civic freedom .. n88 I n no sense did Machiavelli condemn the 
standards of individual Christian ethics. 
It is only when respect f'or the moral virtues 
stands in the way of' political effectiveness 
that they must be disregarded •••• Given 
an end to be accomplished and it is only 
ignorance and weakness that hesitate over 
the necessary means .. 89 
The turbulent condition of' Italian politics he attributed 
mainly to individualism. Therefore he turned to organic i sm , 
considering the state as the supreme end. His spiritual 
allegiance was pledged to the ''Civic religion of the pagan 
,90 • world.' Indiscriminate violence he corxlemns. 'Tt is free-
dom in the crushing of' enemies , not violence in the order of 
domestic affairs that he deme_nds. n91 · His social organicism 
87. Wilde, loc. cit., 217. 
88. Ibid ., 217. 
89. bi~ .' 223. 
90. Ibid., 223. 
91. Ibid. 
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has failed to be adequately appreciated , largely because of 
his illustrating it so exc l usively by the figure of his 
prince . 
Wilde believes r~chiavelli ' s chi ef contribution 
to lie i n his complete frankness, i n his so thoroughl y expos-
ing the evi l s of the system which he advocates. 
His realistic exaltation of the State has in 
it far more wholesome truth than have the 
panegyri cs of its more romantic partisans . 
Politi cs i s a rude busi ness , and no t a nursery 
of the Christian virtues. He who i s not con-
tent to await the s l ow processes of moral de-
velopment , but would force his way directl y 
to his goal, must expect to run counter t o the 
moralities. It was this truth that Machiavelli 
emphasized so forcefull y in his precepts for 
the tyrant.92 
8 .. Kant . 
The materi a l . on Kant contained in the articles dur-
ing this period is surpri singly meager. In fact the only 
artic l e dealing wi th Kantian ethics which s eems at all worthy 
of note is one by Ralph M. Blake entitled "The Ground of Moral 
Obligation. n93 In a stimulating treatment Blake seeks to 
establish the concept that two of Kant ' s great ethical prin-
ciples , the 'categorical imperative' am the ' autonomy of the 
will , ' contradict one another.. Blake expresses himself as in 
entire agreement with Kant concerning the former but in 
92. Wilde, l oc . ci t ., 225. 
93. Blake , Int. J our .. of Eth., 38 (1928), 129-140. 
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or in the recognition of the best, but in the 
fact of the best. My duty remains my duty, 
whether I know that it is, whether I recog-
nize that it is, whether I admit that it is 
or not.98 
The question arises as to just how, according to this 
statement, right and wrong can be determined by the person. 
If the best possible is a fact independent of my knowledge or 
recognition, how ·can I possibly be able to know whether I am 
doing my duty? If I am ignorant of what my duty is, how can 
I be held guilty of not doing it? Nor will it be greatly 
to my credit if I perform my duty, since I may accidentally 
have discovered that independent fact, the best possible. 
The simple truth is that if the best possible is independent 
of human knowledge, no human person can be moral. Goodness 
would be the exclusive possession of the Absolute, who alone 
would know the fact of the best possible. 
Certainly, as Mr. Blake implies, Kant perceived no 
contradiction between the autonomy of the will and the categor-
ical imperative. In view of this fact is it not possible that 
one or both of these terms meant something different to Kant 
than to Mr. Blake? In all probability Kant did not mean by 
the categorical imperative anything so unconditional or 
absolute as Blake has in mind. How categorical could obliga-
'I 
11 tions be without conflicting with the principle of the autonomy 
\ of the will? Mr. Blake kindly provides us with an answer. 
I 
98. Blake, loc. cit., 136. 
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all the value of the product is a result of labor. Perhaps 
his strongest point lies in the statement that: 
The determination of wages depends not only 
on the will of the employer but also on the 
ethical consideration of a given epoch. 
In a society whose structure retains the 
main characteristics of community, no em-
ployer is exempt from moral restraint in 
determining the ways of his employees.l20 
Though these arguments are not without force, it would seem 
Fujisawa had overlooked the strongest point against the theory 
of surplus value, namely, the question of whether such value 
is available and measurable. Though this idea may be implied 
in some of his other arguments, it is not clearly enough 
enunciated. 
From this Fujisawa goes on to attack Marx's material-
istic dialectic. The economic factor alone cannot be held to 
account for world conditions, and hence mere economic reforms 
cannot of themselves better the social order. 
Broa~~inded as we are to appreciate the ful-
ness of the great contribution of Marxism 
toward the clarification of the close relations 
between our moral and intellectual life and 
economic environments, we shall never yield to 
the conception of looking upon the human 
culture simply as the social overstructure 
superimposed on the economic understructure.121 
Before going on to a specific treatment of the 
Japanese situation, Fujisawa questions whether the theory of 
120. Fujisawa, loc. cit., 425. 
121. Ibid., 427. 
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12. Tolstoy. 
Tolstoy is generally considered a subject for the 
study of literature rather than of ethics, religion, or 
social philosophy. This tendency "to reckon his works other 
than his novels, dramas, and short. stories as secondary in 
importance,ul27is challenged in an article by J. H. Abraham 
entitled "The Religious Ideas and Social Philosophy o:f Tol-
stoy. ul28 
Tolstoy's religious and social views were founded 
upon an empirical basis, formulated by his keen observation 
and his intimate contact with all classes of men. In his 
system religion held first place. Though recognizi·ng and 
deploring the abuses to be found within it, Tolstoy sets forth 
not only that "religion is the first articulated outcome of 
man's reason, nl29but also that "religion embraces all the 
other activities and thoughts of man. 11130 According to his 
view, therefore, "morality flows directly from religion.ul31 
Since science and philosophy are derived from religion, it. 
follows that the evils within religion are carried into these 
fields. Thus a reform of religion will result necessarily 
in the advancement of philosophy and science. Judged from 
their effects on the welfare of the individual, modern 
science and art are in Tolstoy's eyes of little value. 
127. Abraham, Int. Jour. of Eth., 40 (1929), 105. 
128. Ibid., 105-120. 
129. Ibid., 109. 
130. Ibid • . 
131. Ibid • . 
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He [Tolstoy] accepts ••• the need and reality 
of Art in a real world. He does more: he con-
siders it one of the indisper~ably necessary 
conditions of human life. He endows it with 
a unique and immensely important fUnction. 
He could not, as Plato did, exile all the poets 
from his republic •••• To Plato art was an 
irresponsible creation, a fantastic dream, a 
land of shadows; to Tolstoy it was a real and 
necessary human activity.l35 
Yet in the moral conception of art the views of 
Plato and Tolstoy coincided in a striking manner. As the 
greatest of Greek art from Homer through the Periclean age 
met with Plato's condemnation, so the art of the Renaissance 
and modern Europe aroused Tolstoy's denunciation. Both based 
their criterion of the value of art on 11an external premedi t-
ated and predetermined moral code."136 Yet they took the 
wrong approach to the task of relating art and morality. 
''Their view is really a negation of the moral function of art. 
They would compel it to distort experience, to evaluate it 
before its objectification."137 Knox's study represents an 
interesting contribution to our knowledge of Tolstoy as re-
lated to the Platonic conception of art. If anything, he 
is fairer to the former than to the latter. 
135. Knox, 1oc • cit. , 508. 
136. Ibid., 509. 
137 . Ibid. 
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13. Nietzsche. 
In a day when we so often hear his philosophy held 
responsible for so many of the world's evils, it is refreshing 
to find an article showing a genuine insight into Nietzsche'.s 
thought. Such a treatment is to be found in an article by E. 
T. Mitchell entitled "Nietzsche on Ideals.n138Introducing first 
the question as to whether or not Nietzsche may be called an 
idealist, Mitchell concludes that this depends on our defin-
ition of idealism. Nietzsche, t o be sure, did not conceive 
of spiritual values functioning on a cosmic scale. He did, 
however, recognize the power of ideals and values both as a 
factor in history and as a potential source of progress. 
"He is one of the few who believe that the destiny of the race 
can be changed by a change of values, and that a change of 
values can be effected by individuals. 11139 
According to Mitchell, Nietzsche made several note-
worthy contributions to thought with respect to values and 
ideals. First among these is his analysis of the facts of 
valuation. His classification of human values under the herd 
type and the master type is certainly open to criticism. 
Nevertheless he is credited by Mitchell as formulating the 
problem "of values, of the origins of values, of the rank and 
sequence of values, and of the types of values. 11 1-40 Surely we 
138. Mitchell, Int. Jour. of Eth., 38 (1928), 316-334. 
139. Ibid., 316. 
140. Ibid., 325. 
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CHAPTER III. 
RECENT WRITERS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. 
1. Bradley. 
Turning from historic~l articles to those on more 
recent writers in the field of ethics, we first discuss that 
great British idealist, F. H. Bradley. The ethical system 
of Bradley includes several levels of morality. The first 
of these is essentially descript ive, consisting simply in 
an analysis of moral behavior as it exists. In the words 
of M. R. Konvitz, "Here he is a photographer rather than a 
1 painter of visions. 11 In this level Bradley emphasizes the 
factor of obligation, stressing especially man's relation to 
his social environment. The very title of Bradley's essay 
embodying this conception, nMy Station and Its Duties," is 
revealing. nMy station," he says , "I do not create but find 
waiting for me, and a station without duties, a sinecure, is 
a contradiction • • • at least in theory; for duties and 
rights are correlative. 112 
Yet, as we have already indicated, Bradley does not 
stop on this mainly descriptive level, but goes on to a more 
nonnative aspect. "The self ••• has a threefold content, 
furnished, first, by my station and its duties, second by the 
1. Konvitz, Int. Jour. of Eth., 41 (1930), 9. 
2. Ibid. 
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ideal of social perfection, and, third, by the ideal of the 
non-social self ."3 Thus the highest ideal, that of' the non-
social self, transcends any community. It possesses a mys-
tical element, a union with the absolute which defies descrip-
tion. This concept is completely individualistic, since 
the ideal self of any person is unique, differing from that 
of any other. "·To attain my ideal self I have no other aid 
or guide but my own understanding, and I am moral only in so 
far as I live a truly critical and self- conscious life. 114 
This normative and ideal factor in Bradley ' s ethics 
pervades his entire system. Not only does he characterize 
reality as the all-inclusive and complete, but also as the 
perfect. In the words of Segerstedt, "Reality is not only 
something which must be and may be and therefore is. It is 
5 
also something which ought to be.u This concept of reality, 
identified as it is with value, serves as the criterion of . 
that self-realization which is the highest aim of morality. 
This criterion functions chiefly by means of' the immediate 
experience of satisfaction. 
~Vhen a fresh quality is added to the old state, 
it either brings satisfaction or dissatisfac-
tion, and the intensity of this feeling is the 
standard by which the reality is measured. 
Bradley uses the same criterion of' satisfaction 
in the realization of the self •••• In Brad-
ley's doctrine of satisfaction we find the bridge 
by which he passes from the all-inclusive and 
complete to the perf'ect.6 
3. Konvitz, loc. cit., 11. 
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The position which he attacks is one which 
regards knowing as a mental a~air which is 
extraneous to the object known, which there-
~ore lies outside o~ the nature which in 
science am in practical conduct we seek to 
know.l4 
To Dewey '1re~lective intelligence is but the further evolution 
o~ a natura~ process .n15 The activity arising out o~ problem-
a:tical situations, which takes the ~orm of blin:i trial and 
error on the part of the animal s, becomes a set o~ controlled 
experimental. operations on the part o~ man, leading to the 
formulation of workable hypotheses. The conclusions Dewey 
reaches by this empirical method result in a pluralistic and 
non-mechanistic view of reality, recognizing numerous process-
es which are aimed at ends in nature but are not directed 
toward any supreme value or em in view. Thus it behooves 
man, who is himself a part o~ nature, to convert natural 
processes to his own use, thereby introducing an element of 
value. n·The responsibility lies with us. Intelligence has 
brought this responsibility upon us, and it has also gi~ted 
us and our undertaking with the zest of adventure.nl6 
The contribution of these articles by Mead is two-
fold. In them. he has presented a scholarly analysis o~ 
America ' s philosophical background and a sympathetic, clear, 
accurate survey o~ Dewey' s thought . Yet one pervading view-
14. Mead, Int. Jour. of Eth., 46 (1935), 74. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid., 80. 
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point o~ Mead's seems open to question. His entire thesis 
implies that a philosophy best re~lecting the social and 
economic setti ng o~ America most nearly appr oaches truth. 
Yet while a philosophy , to be meani~ul to Americans, must 
be based on the experience o~ the American individual, this 
does not at all mean t hat a philosophy which per~ectly r e-
~lects the American environment may not rank l ow as de scrip-
tion o~ reality as a whol e . In :fact i s it not a deba table 
question whether a philosophy ts re~lec ion o~ the s cial 
envi ronment ~rom which it springs can be a criterion o~ its 
ru h? Reverting to the previous chapter, we may say hat 
i~ Aristotle's idea o~ God's r elation to t he world was in any 
sense an outgrowth of' the relation of' the I'lacedonian Empe r 
to the Gr eek city- tates, this had nothing whatever to do 
wi h its truth in depicting the nature o~ reality as a whole . 
Similarly the ~act that Dewey' s philosophy stands a s the 
best r eflection of' the Ameri can social and economic environ-
ment, means little with respect to its metaphysical s atus. 
3 . Gentile a roce. 
Concerning modern I talian philosophy, three articles 
by Valmai Burdwood Evans , two on Gentile and one on Croce, 
form t e basis of' our discussion. We have seen how Bradley 
denied the distinc tion between reality and value . In Gentile 
we find this same identi~ication , and Evans himsel~ points 
out its simi larity to the view o~ Bradley. l7 
17. Cf. Ev~_ Int . Jo~~·_E~th., 39 _(1929), 206. 
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'Realities' are seen to lose their reality 
except so far as they have value. A crime is 
only real so far as it is action of some sort, 
and therefore has a value -it realizes an ideal 
of a kind. It is unreal just where it lacks 
value. To be bad is to be not-good, that is, 
not to be. True reality therefore is identical 
with value; it is the u~on of being with what 
ought to be.l8 
The seat of this reality Gentile believes to be in mind, or 
the process of active thinking. This activity of thought 
abolishes the distinction between existence and value, be-
tween subject and object, between intellect and will. 
As with Bradley the concept of self-realization plays a 
prominent part in the system of Gentile, and Gentile agrees 
in finding the fullest self-realization in union with the 
Absolute. Gentile places much emphasis on the additional 
factor of creativity from Which he derives a measure of free-
dom of the will. ''A self-realizing reality i s also self-
creative, and to create one's self is to be f'ree. tt19 t1Choice 
is made in the self-creative act which creates being and 
combines freedom with necessity."20 
The freedom of man is possible only ~hrough 
understanding , that is, creation of facts, 
and the awareness of the activity which unites 
them with the infinite mind which is the union 
of value and reality •••• Self-realization 
is, to a limited extent, the privilege of every 
being whom we call a person, but in its infinite 
completion can be found only in the self-realiza-
tion of the absolute mind, which is therefore 
the infinite and perfect person.21 
18. Evans, loc. cit., 206. 
19. Ibid., 209. 
20. Ibid., 210. 
21. Ibid., 213. 
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Gentile 1s identification of intellect and will 
results in his ruling out the difference between logic and 
ethics and re-establishes the proposition that knowledge 
is virtue. His belief in a limited freedom of the human will 
and in a certain moral. autonomy lead Gentile to give a large 
place to the values of love and self-denial. The emphasis 
which he places on the person's creating facts and his fail-
ure to recognize a difference.between subject and object 
contain certain sol,i):Si"Stic implications which Evans apparently 
chooses to ignore. Perhaps he is justified in this, since 
he is dealing primarily with Gentile's ethics rather than 
with his metaphysics. 
In a later article Evans analyzes Gentile's educa-
tional contribution as Italian minister of public instruction. 
His continued attempts to raise the Italian standard of cul-
ture, to abolish illiteracy, to introduce improved methods, 
and to provide an effective program of adult education have 
borne valuable fruit. His general program constitutes a 
direct application of his philosophical conclusions to the 
field of education. Here his theory of self-realization 
is especially influential. 
Theory of education merges into philosophy 
when we admit that philosophy is self-
realization, a progressive development of 
mind, and that just this is the education 
which is necessary to man, an education of 
the will as it is of the intelligence.22 
22. Evans, Int. Jour. of Eth., 43 (1933), 213. 
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values of utility and moral goodness. 't.:Every action is at 
l east useful though not necessarily moral. To be good is 
to possess a higher value in addition to the value of utility 
or teconomic t value , as Croce calls it. 1128 Since all moral 
acts include some element of utility and self-interest, the 
distinction between duty and pleasure breaks down. The 
fields of logic and aesthetics are in a sense independent of 
morality, yet it is the moral duty of the philosopher to 
think truly and of the artist to be the best possible artist. 
Our recognition of an act as moral is dependent upon in-
tuition, 11 that perceptual knowledge which Croce says is 
necessary to action when he denies that the will is ever 
blind. 1129 
4. Whitehead. 
Perhaps the chief polemic of Whitehead is directed 
against that movement of compartmentalization in philosophy 
which, beginning with Descartes, bas sought to separate 
values from existence. As is shown in an article by George 
Morgan, Jr. , Whi t.ehead ' s thinking is directed by- "the ideal 
of a coherent system in which all parts presuppose one 
another. Hence his philosophy includes values from the start 
and does not bring t hem in later as an apologetic after-
. thought. •t30 
28. Evans, loc. cit., 60-61. 
29. Ibid., 64. 
30. Morgan, Int. Jour. of Eth., 47 (193?}p 308. 
I L_ 
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\f.hitehead believes the error of placing values in a separate 
and often subjective realm to be an outgrowth of the false 
category of substance which has been eliminated by the rise 
of the relativity theory. " If the actualities themselves 
are infected with flux and relativity , there is no reason 
to banish values for a kindred crime. n31 "Things are no 
longer simply located in their own windowless houses - each 
visits the other a.rd forms part. of its very being. •t32 From 
the principle of relativi ty Whi tehead also draws the con-
clusion that ultimate actualities are acts of experience 
possessing both mental and physical qualities and related 
by means of 1mutual immanence•. 33 
Yet Whi t.ehead fails to reduce t.he world to mere 
relativity, admitting that "Each actuality is a process o:f 
self-enjoyment for its own sake, absolute in its subjective 
immediacy. tt·34_ This transcendent absoluteness is but moment-
ary, arising out of and pas s ing into relativity. 35 Whitehead 
conceives of all realization as finite, excluding the possibil 
ity of' a highest or all-inclusive good. "The principle of 
limitation denies the Absol ute and explains why God requires 
a temporal world in which his incompatible ideals may be sue-
cessively realized.u36 The central problem of Whitehead, 
31. Morgan, loc. cit., 308 . 
32. Ibid., 310. 
33. Cf. ibid., 308. 
34. Ibid::-310-311. 
35. Cf. ibid., 311. 
36. Ibid~ll-312. 
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point o:f agreement among them. All are trying to identify 
value with reality or existence or both. Bradley, Gentile, 
and Cr oce follow the method of' absolute idealism; Dewey 
fi nds the processes of nature becoming values when used to 
f urther human ems; Whitehead finds in the principle of' 
r elativity a means of uniting t ertiary quali t ies with the 
physical world. The problem of evil is specifically 
emphas i zed in only wo of the a r ticles, t hose on Croce and 
Whitehead. Both, strangely enough, i nclude it nier value 
by means of distinguishing between value am moral goodness. 
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an L~potent nod of sanguine approval of pre-
cisely those phenomena which are the most 
perplexing, and that in moments of logical 
storm and stress it appear s to serve us only 
because it is blind to the real problems 
presented by the sundry troublesome s t ages 
· of the passing show.5 
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the 
attitude of natural piety is not without some rational basis. 
This view rests ultimately upon the assumption that the f unc-
tion of the category is chiefly descriptive and denotative 
rather than explanatory in the usual sense o.f the word. 
Yet this passive acceptance of nature's revelation of herself 
is certainly insufficient. Such a view would hardly transcend 
na~ve realism, would in fact place reliance on too uncritical 
an acceptance of mere appearance. Beyond this stage we must 
go~ not by the uncertain means of intuition but rather by 
means of intelligence. In seeking what is intelligible we 
are unwilling to stop, with the advocate of natural piety, 
at t he immediately given data. Rather we are in search of 
the object of thought , as ·: mediately given, in other words 
the thinkable. 
\'#hen we say that the real is determined by 
intelligence, what we mean is that the im-
mediately given is not all there is of the ob-
ject of thought, that the datum originally and 
directly presented demands correction in the 
light of its implicative context, and that 
this light is revealed only through the pro-
cesses of intelligence.6 
5. Cunningham, loc. cit. , 153. · 
6. Ibid., 161. 
In view of this function of intelligence, the categories 
may be in a sense considered explanatory instead of purely 
descriptive and denotative. The distinction Cunningham has 
in mind appears to be that between uncritical and coherent 
description, the latter being identified with explanation. 
With this distinction in mind, we revert to the 
question of whether the doc t rine of emergence can be called 
explanatory, that is intelligible in the sense just defined. 
Can the unpredictable be intelligible? According to Cunning-
II 
ham, it can if sufficient emphasis is placed on the meta-
I 
If this principle and its implica- 1 physical reality of time. 
tiona are accepted, the doctrine of emergence becomes the best 
explanation we have of the process of becoming. 
Turning from the theoretical aspect of evolution 
to its more direct bearing on ethics, we recognize that the 
evolutionary approach has resulted in a stressing of the 
genetic method, that is, the study of higher forms in terms 
of lower, less developed ones. While the correct use of 
this method has indeed resulted in important contributions, 
it cannot be fruitful when taken as the sole or even the 
principle means of investigation. ttAccording to this method 
man is what he ~' and the proper study of mankind is 
7 
monkeys." 
7. Otto, Int. Jour. of Eth., 39 (1929), 190-204, 192. 
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II 
No doubt the study o~ the past throws light 
on the present, but the present is not, 
there~ore, the past. The creature we call 
man emerged as less than human in the great 
panorama o~ li~e and he has r~t escaped the 
influence o~ that ~act. This does not prove 
that he never emerged at all, or that he is 
today what he was when he emerged •••• The 
stage at which man has arrived is at least 
as authentic a revelation o~ his quality 
as any which may be selected ~rom the ages 
le~t behind.8 
A more valuable aspect o~ the genetic method lies 
in the attention it throws upon the process o~ development. 
By no means all students o~ the evolutionary process would 
agree with Otto in i~erring ~rom it the prospect o~ inde~in-
ite progress fn· the ~uture. He, however, sees the possibil-
ity that the man o~ the fUture may discover a means of 
reconcilir~ his con~licting drives toward individualism and 
altruism, that he may succeed in smashing the economic tyranny 
with which he is now cursed. 
Man's nature cannot be exhausted in one 
stratum o~ existence. He is what he is in 
the complexity and contradictoriness o~ his 
present striving.. He is what he ~ in 
those ages of which he is the ripening fruit. 
He is what he shall ~ind the means of becoming 
in the generations to be while yet his race 
may last.9 
Extremely pessimistic in his view of the effects of 
the evolutionary concept is Norman ~V'ilde. Among other 'evils' 
which have resulted from it he mentions the destruction o~ 
8. Otto., loc. cit., 193. 
9. Ibid., 203: 
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religious faith, the rise of naturalism and mechanism, and 
the consequent attempt to apply the methods of physical science 
to the realm of values. His bitterness reaches its peak when 
he says that in psychology 
Reason has lost its significance and even 
identity, appearing today only in the form 
of rationalization, that ~ post facto affRir 
whose function is the whitewashing of the 
disreputable in guman nature.lO 
The chief effect of the evolutionary principle on ethics Wilde 
finds in the increased attributing of moral principles to non-
moral origins. The idea that moral standards were originally 
formulated as means of survival has led to the belief that they 
are not absolute, but are to be adapted to specific situations. 
Hence moral values have been given an instrumental rather than 
an intrinsic status. The advantage of competition has been 
stressed at the expense of social cooperation. 
Wilde's analysis seems extremely exaggerated and one-
sided. .Many of the factors which he designates. as evils do not 
necessarily fall into this class. For example, the decline 
of authoritarianism which he so deplores may be considered a 
blessing in many respects. The same may be said of the in-
creased emphasis on empirical procedure and on individualistic 
values. Furthermore, some of the :factors which he attributes 
to 'evolution' have a very indirect and remote relation to it. 
10. Wilde, Int. Jou~l of Eth., 45 (1934), 65-80, 66. 
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The rise of the cult of science, the emphasis of physics 
over biology, and the development of individualism, for ex-
ample, cannot be said to have sprung directly from the evolu-
tionary principle. Creative, theistic and emergent evolution 
Wilde chooses to ignore. The benefits of evolution including 
the greatly increased light it has thrown on the nature of 
reality he likewise overlooks. tVhatever may be his general 
philosophic outlook, Wilde's treatment of evolution would 
certainly draw the applause of the reactionary conservatives, 
the pessimists, the sceptics. 
The theory, mentioned by Wilde, to the effect that 
moral values are derived from no~oral sources finds a strong 
refutation in the words of Bruce W. Brotherston. "That view," 
he declares, ''is mistaken in which moralists have assumed 
that homo sapiens arrived upon the planet long before homo 
moralis • "11 
What this view overlooks is that the ethical 
feeling-tone, though mistakenly extended to 
accident and natural event, is by no means 
less profound among primitive peoples than 
among advanced races. Moral evil in early 
attitudes, while it is essentially a super-
individual t:a:~t ·:. and may attach to the . 
individual entirely by accident and not by 
his own volition, carries with it precisely 
the feeling of moral opprobrium and with 
profound intensity •••• Every student of 
early peoples finds the feeling-tone of moral 
good present among them to a passionate degree • 
• • • Of homo sapiens, homo moralis is the 
motivating spirit. Within his moral conscious-
ness, responsibility, though not yet arrived 
11. Brotherston, Int. Jour. of Eth., 39 (1929), 477. 
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at individual self-consciousness • • • was 
nevertheless a powerful impulse and a passion-
ate feeling.l2 
2. Personality. 
(a) The Place of Personality in Recent Ethics. 
Turning from a discussion of evolution to the 
highest known result of its process, we are surprised by 
the meager quantity of material written on personality as 
1 such. As a matter of fact, the sole article in these volumes 
dealing entirely with this subject is that by M. c. Otto 
cited in our treatment of the evolutionary principle. The 
paucity of material on personality seems all the more striking 
when we consider that such factors as value and obligation 
are treated largely in terms of their relation to persons. 
Throughout the numerous articles on value, the fundamental 
. nature of personality is presupposed. Yet a factor so vital 
to ethics as the unity of personality is mentioned only twice, I 
and then in an incidental manner. Referring to the import- 1 
ance of a life-plan, D. H. Parker says: 
Interesting problems regarding the unity of 
the self are involved here; for obviously 
any possible satisfaction which I judge to 
be finally good or evil will be mine; and 
even when evil, will be intrinsically good, 
since it is a satisfaction; there will there-
fore be a division within the self, a conflict 
between good and good, yet a conflict which 
contains the principle of its own solution; 
12. Brotherston, loc. cit., 477-478. 
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for the very desire from which the 'evil' 
satisfaction springs is taken account of 
in the life plan that condemns it.l3 
The other mention of personal unity is by T. v. Smith, having 
reference to the procedure of psychoanalysis. "It [conscience] 
pushes by suppression for the unification of consciousness." 14 
(b) Freedom. 
The only aspect of personality covered adequately 
in these articles concerns the subject of freedom. The experi-
ence of freedom of. choice is seen by all articles mentioning 
it,as utterly indispensable to the existence of moral values, 
especially the consciousness of responsibility. In several 
treatments the work of Nicholai Hartmann in this field is 
cited. 
Were there no such thing as personal freedom, 
the values which ordinarily move the will to 
action would, on Hvtmann 's view, still be · 
there. But they would be morally indifferent.l5 
The several writers agree that moral freedom need not imply 
metaphysical indeterminism. In the words of Schilpp: 
Moral freedom is not freedom of the will or 
even freedom of choice, but freedom of the 
reflective reason to pass upon and control 
the steps of its own present and future self-
determination. • • • Moral freedom implies 
the ability to construct one's own proximate 
ends •••• Without freedom there is no 
responsibility, and without responsibility 
it is impossible to speak of actions as moral 
any significant sense of the word.l6 
13. Parker, Int. Jour. of Eth., 44 (1934), 306. 
14. Smith, Int. Jour. of Eth., 44 (1933), 128. 
15. Hook, Int. tJour. of Eth., 40 (1930), 207. 
16. ~~L-~~r. of Eth., 47 (_llt.3Q)_,_ 67__._ 
in 
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overshadows all other ethical factors. Values are defined 
by most of the writers in terms of personal desire, interest, 
or, especially in the case of moral values, in terms of ap-
proval. A somewhat surprising factor in this respect is the 
general disregard of ideas or ideals in relation to value ex-
hibited by these modern ethicists. Actually only Mueller20 
and Parker21 appear to recognize them as of importance. The 
question \rlth which virtually all of these articles are 
most concerned is the objectivity of value. The exact nature 
of the distinction between objective and subjective values is 
a matter of some dispute. According to K. R. Srinivasiengar, 
a theory is subjective if it holds that value 
is in some sense related to, or dependent upon, 
the interest or the conative-affective life 
of the subject of experience, while a theory 
which believes that value is a quality of the 
objects themselves, or at least that it is an 
essence, a universal, which exists or subsists 
independently of the experiencing subject and 
his needs and desires, may properly be called 
objective.22 
On the other hand, A. P. Brogan defines objectivity as follows: 
Objectivism refers to the following assumption. 
If I say that this is intrnnsically better than 
that, and you say that the same is not intrinsic-
ally better than that, then one of us has judged 
truly and the ather has judged falsely. In 
other words we are to. treat value judgments as 
objectively true or fa.lse. • • • This definition 
neither assumes nor denies that intrinsic valu-
ables are to be found only within the realm of 
20. Mueller, Int. Jour. of Eth., 39 (1929), 468. 
21. Parker, Int. Jour. of Eth., 40 (1929), 38. 
22. Srinivasiengar, Int. Jour. of Eth., 45 (1935}, 413. 
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conscious experience. Subjectivism, on the 
other hand, is that method which treats every 
so-cal~ed intri~sic value as strictly neither 
true nor false. 3 
Again, Henry w. Wright defines objectivity in terms of ex-
terna~ relation. 
The basis of objective value is objective 
relation -but a relation that is objective 
in the double sense of (1) existing object-
ively, and (2) holding between existing ob-jects themselves and not between existing 
objects and the needs or desires of human 
individuals and groups.24 
:j The issue is further conf'used by the fact that some writers 
I who hold what Brogan refers to as the objective concept of 
I~ values nevertheless call it subjective. It is possible that 
this is even true of Hook when he says, ''The doctrine of the 
subjectivity of' value is just a way of calling attention to a 
level of being in which the personal will is constitutive.n25 
,, 
I 
A study of the context of' Hook 's s.tatement reveals his appar-
ent belief that its having an ess.ential reference to the self 
makes a value subjective. Eaton even suggests that 11Iv!r. Hook 
• • • is guilty of wiping out the distinction between sub-
jective and objective in axiology." 26 
A survey of the various statements concerning sub-
jectivity and objectivity shows that H. W. \¥right stands 
virtually alone in holding to so extreme a form of value 
23. Brogan, Int. Jour. of Eth., 41 (1931), 287-288. 
24. Wright, Int. Jour~ of' Eth., 42 (1932), 255. 
25. Hook, loc. cit., 188-189. 
26. Eaton, Int. Jour. of' Eth., 43 (1932), 28. 
83 
====~~=====-~==-~=-~· ~=-=====-~~---====~=-=-=============~==== 
\t; 
84 
======~=-==~~--=-=--=-=-======:====================================~======== 
objectivity. Hook brings out the fact that the reasoning 
behiP.d any belief in values existing independently of per-
sonality rests on the ·quest for certainty. "The basis of 
ethical realism is not an argument but a wish. It is the 
wish for certainty.n 27 . 
Hook's condemnation is directed not only against 
those who believe in value as contained in the object but 
more specifically against a group of phenomenologists in-
cluding Scheler and ;Hartmann. According to the phenomenolog-
ical axiology, as Eaton shows, "Values, although they are the 
products of a subjective will, are also the denizens of an 
objective realmof ~ We~enheiten. 1128 Thus by means of this 
phenomenological school the concepts of the Platonic realm 
of ideas, the Aristotelian eid~, and the Scholastic essentia 
are once more becoming influential. 
The majority of the writers of these articles take 
the position that values cannot exist independently of per-
sonality. In the words of D. H. Parker, "Values are not in 
any .sense given to or independent of experience, but are 
created in the course of experience itself. 1129 Referring to 
the external world, Parker further states: tt·External objects 
are often necessary conditions for the existence of values; 
they may therefore be valuable; but they cannot be the values 
27. Hook, loc. cit., 191. 
28. Eaton, 1oc. cit., 25. 
29. Parker, Int. Jour. of Eth., 48 (1938), 490. 
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that are ascribed to them." 30 Accordir~ to R. B. Perry, 
value should not be de:fined "in terms so broad as to extend 
beyond the linli ts o:f consciousness. n 31 
It may be considered unfortunate that so much spaee . 1 
i s devoted to the question o:f values' independence o:f personalJ 
ity and so little to other aspects o:f their nature, such as 
their relative status and :functions. Little attempt is made 
at :formulating a classi:fication o:f values. Axiological 
pluralism is :favored over monism, Brogan32and Hoak33 lead-
ing the at tack against subordinat ing values under a single 
intrinsic one and Savery3~ontributing a biting article 
against G. E. Moore '·s concept o:f the Good. Hook's remark-: 
concerning the pluralism o:f moral values is particularly 
signi:ficant. 
Every value has a tendency to usurp power 
and set i tsel:f up as a dictator o:f the entire 
ethical rea~. But the rigorism o:f the :fanatic 
who sacri:fices everything to one virtue, be it 
truth, or justice, or bravery, or good :form - is 
ethical blindness.35 
Concerning the relation o:f moral values to other 
types o:f value, little is said. The intrinsic values o:f the 
moral, the aesthetic and the intellectual are occasionally 
recognized, but in articles specifically on axiology there is 
no mention o:f religious values. 
30. Parker, loc. cit., 479. 
31. Perry, Int. Jour. o:f Eth., 41 (1931), 430. 
32. Brogan, 1o£. cit. 287-295. 
33. Hook, 1oc. cit., 179-210. 
34. Savery~nt:-Jour. o:f Eth., 47 (1937), 210-223. 
35. Hook, loc. cit., 197. 
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One of the few statements of the relation of the moral to 
other values is found in the following words of H. w. Wright: 
Moral value is in some sense inclusive of 
all other real values. A life cannot be 
morally good, or morally best • • • which 
does not include the pursuit and attainment 
of knowledge and the appreciation and e~ 
joymen~ of beauty •••• All values create 
obligations or imperatives. And eve~y 
imperative, every ~rmative i~unction, 
is moral. The scientific or artistic 
conscience are instances of conscience in 
the moral sense. ;sut moral obligatin:g is 
authoritative over all other imperatives, 
e.g., intellectual and aesthetic, because 
it commands the best use of all the opportun-
ities of life. In case of conflict it voices 
the claims of all the values of life as over 
against the demands of any one or any less-
er number.36 
The tenn, 'thierarchy of val.ues, " is occasionally 
mentioned37 in these articles. Yet. nowhere is its significance 
discussed or its nature elaborated.. Again, the tenn 'instru-
mental values' appears in a few axiological. treatments, but 
one looks in vain for what these values consist of. The 
question as to whether there are instrumental values incap-
able ever of reaching intrinsic status seems not even to be 
raised. The desirability, perhaps even the necessity, of 
communicating and sharing values is suggested,38 but again 
one looks in vain for any specific, clear-cut discussion on 
36. wright, 42 (1932), 265. 
37. E.g., Parker, 44 (1934), 311-312; Dubs, 40 (1930), 488. 
38. Cf. Wright, 1oc. cit., 262-263; Parker, 40 (1930), 471. 
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than what is. Yet Felix s. Cohen contends that this is a 
false distinction. 
Objections to _the possibility of ethical 
science must find some other basis than the 
alleged distinction between the realm of 
fact and the realm of value. Values are 
facts, and if they are facts of a peculiar 
sort, so too are colors, sounds, and in-
tervals of time. 41 
With this assumption Cohen goes on. to apply the scientific 
method to the data of ethics. In this he finds two steps: 
''the logical implication and development of possible hypoth-
eses, and the testing of these hypotheses in the light of 
the facts of moral perception. 1142 The remainder of' Cohen • s 
article turns out to be a rather conventional analysis of the 
nature of the concepts 'good' ar.d 'duty.t But Cohen has 
introduced a f'actor which is of great interest. In what sense 
may the method of experiment be used in ethics? To what ex-
tent may the controlled conditions of the laboratory be 
carried over into the moral realm? In the field of practical 
morals, as Norman Wilde points out, the effect of attempted 
experiment is likely to be disastrous. The individual is 
inclined to forget that, 
while in the laboratory an experiment may be 
repeated again ani again on a practically 
unlimited material, he has only one life to 
live, and the experiment once made, :for good 
or for evil,. can never be repeated.43 
41. Cohen, Int. Jour. of' Eth., 42 (1932), 399. 
42. Ibid., 4.01. 
43. Wilde, Int. Jour. of Eth., 39 (1928), 68. 
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Thus we see that the analogy between physical 
science and ethics has its distinct limits. Also we are com-
pelled in spite of Cohen to admit the validity of the dis-
tinction between the descriptive and the normative. The 
'ought' transcends the 'is 1 in a sense foreign to any data 
of the descriptive sciences. In the words of Srinivasiengar: 
In view of the fact that value is always de-
~ermined by reference to the degree of the 
objects' conformity to a norm or standard 
in appreciation, the science of value may 
conveniently be called normatics.44 
Eaton, as previously quoted, used the term 'formulations' 
with respect to ethical science, and we may indeed say that 
ethics is a science in its being composed of systematic formu-
lations of the data within a specific field. In a science sue 
formulations are generally termed laws. Yet. strangely enough 
the writers of these articles seldom speak of the laws of 
ethics. The term 'moral law' is occasionally used in re-
ferring to the Kantian formalism. Only Parker and Myers45 ap-
pear to use the term in any other sense. "The life plan," 
Parker says, ttis just as much a law governing events. in the 
life of the individual as any so-called law of nature.n46 
The normative principle leads us to turn briefly to 
the specific character of obligation itself. Most of the 
44. Srini vasiengar, loc • cit. , 420. 
45. Myers, Int. Jour. of Eth., 48 (1938), 193-213. 
' 46. Parker, loc. cit., 308. 
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writers find it to be based on value. Schilpp, on the 
other hand, traces ·obligation to a more primary source, 
namely personality. "A man's moral duty (or obligation) is 
to be true to himself as a rational, purposive, developing 
being.u47 What, it may be asked, are the limits of obliga-
tion? According to Gardner Williams , "the means to a man 1 s 
ultimate aims in life are an obligation to him. Contrary 
to the Kantian doctrine, they are an obligation whether they 
,. 48 
are possible or not." Eaton, citing Brentano, takes a 
more rational view when he says, •tone. must pay attention to 
what is thought to be the best which can be realized of' all 
that lies under one 1 s control. u49 
5. Conscience. 
A discussion of obligation naturally leads to a con-
sideration of' the fUnction of conscience, the motivating 
source of much that goes under the name of duty. D. B. Klein, 
in his article on uThe Psychology of Conscience,u50presents 
an excellent discussion of the basic forces operating in the 
function of the spontaneous conscience. Its origins in the 
experience of the infant, his physiological reactions, his 
utter dependence upon his mother or nurse, his pleasure at her 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
Schilpp, loc. cit., 69. 
Williams, Int. Jour. of Eth., 40 (1930), 539. 
Eaton, 43 (1933), 265. 
Klein, Int. Jour. of Eth., 40 (1930), 246-262. 
=----====--=--==:=:::rl=====-====--===-~-=======-___:__ __________ _ 
90 

1-··--
I 92 
=t= 
Another important contribution to the problem lies 
in T. v. Smith•s53article on the place of conscience in the 
psycho-analytic system, with special reference to the rela-
tion of the 'id, 1 the 'ego ' and the 1 super ego. ' The chasten-
ing, the controlling of conscience, its transformation from a 
spontaneous to a critical instrumentr-
Conscience ••• has its w~ wherever it can, 
however it must. It pushes by suppression 
for the unification of consciousness; it 
pushes by coercion for the regimentation of 
men and the conquest of nature. But, for all 
that, conscience is grounded .in consciousness, 
which, though conscience, is more than conscience. 
The fated push of conscience for power, inner 
and outer, the contemplative consciousness may 
appropriate, and by appropriating perhaps 
neutralize and at last transmute into the 
aesthetic gold of dynamic essence.54 
6. Pessimism and Scepticism. 
The uncertain and arbitrary quality of the individual 
conscience is one of the factors leading to the attitude of 
pessimism and scepticism toward philosophy and ethics. Among 
the articles under discussion there is one treatment of philo-
sophic pessimism and one of ethical scepticism. In their 
struggle against these attitudes, the two writers bring out 
important ideas too often neglected in the other articles. 
The evidence of science concerning the ultimate extinction 
of the human race, the inability of man adequately to satisfy 
53. Smith, Int. Jour. of Eth., 44 (1933), 106-128. 
54. Ibid., 128. 
93 
~~~-----=-~· ~====~-------------·-~=-====== --·---- ----------· 
his most worthy desires and aspirations, and the belief that 
the evils of the world exceed the goods; these three argu-
ments, designated by E. ·T_. Mitche1155as the cosmological, 
the psychological, and the statistical, constitute the chief 
grounds for pessimism. Since the cosmological and statist-
ical reduce to the psychological, his chief attack is made 
upon the latter. The discrepancy between desire and reality 
may be faced either by adjusting desire to reality or reality 
to desire. nit is the essence of pessimism to insist on 
the first method; it is the essence of optimism to tackle 
the second. uSG S0me have hoped that the progress of modern 
science would aid man in realizing his higher desires. Yet 
in Mitchell's opinion, ''an optimism based on the conquering 
power of science over nature is as shallow as the pessimism 
based on the conquering power of reason over desire. n57 
Both these views, he feels, are mistaken in their assumption 
that the ''opposition and discord between desire and reality 
is real. 1158 Is it not possible that some of the maladjust-
ment between the two is a temporary result of the process of 
growth? 
Ultimately Mitchell's argument against philosophic 
pessimism is based on an appeal to ideals. Rejecting ideal-
ization in the more superficial sense, he points out that 
55. Mitchell, Int. Jour. of Eth., 41 (1931), 480-492. 
56. Ibid., 490. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Ibid. -+=-~--
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CHAPTER V. 
, TEE RELATION BETWEEN ETHICS AND THE SCIENCES. 
1. Ethics and the Related Descriptive Sciences. 
a. Sociology. 
This chapter aims at a brief' survey of' the relation 
between ethics and the other sciences with which it is most 
closely associated. The first subject of' our discussion is 
one of' the youngest of' the descriptive sciences, sociology. 
Its relation with ethics is first of' all historical. As 
1 Bryson so clearly shows, the subjec~now included in the 
study of' sociology were until recently included in moral 
philosophy. The chief' distinction between ethics and sociol-
ogy lies of course in the normative character of the fonner 
. and the descriptive nature of' the latter. Von Wiese makes 
this distinction clear by stating that a value-judgment is 
something "which the sociologist as such cannot make (although 
he must make it as a human being). u2 The attempts of such 
writers as Parsons3to introduce normative values into sociol-
ogy serve ;· only to confuse the issue. Few sociologists would 
' accept his conclusions, especially his denial that "there is 
in social or any
4
other science a rigid line between science \ 
and philosophy·'' The following statement by Cha.rner . M. Perry I 
1. Bryson, Int. Jour. of' Eth., 42 (1932), 304. 
2. Von Wiese,. Int. Jour. of' Eth., 44 (1934), 222. 
3. Parsons, Int. Jour. of' Eth., 45 (1935), 282-316. 
4. Ibid., 315. 
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through which one individual do~inates 
others and gives to each • • • a greater 
freedom to arrange his life according to 
his own pattern. The potential service of 
social psychology, therefore, lies in its 
bestowal of power, not over human nature, 
but over the agencies which exercise power. 
It gives control over control.l3 
2. Ethics and Other Normative Sciences. 
a. Aesthetics. 
The moral and aesthetic are of necessity closely 
related. Already in our treatment of values we have had 
occasion to observe this association. 14 For the moral life 
involves the most inclusive value experience, including the 
realization of aesthetic values. Likewise the aesthetic 
conscience which drives the artist to his highest creative 
expression is similar if not identical with moral obligation. 
When aesthetic and moral imperatives come into direct con-
flict the moral should be considered supreme. Yet the 
aesthetic must be granted a measure of autonomy, since it 
is an intrinsic value. Something of the relation between 
these t.wo fields is expressed in the words of Herbert E. Cory: 
. 
To respect the [aesthetic} medium is to love 
it; to recognize its autonomy as in the eth-
ical life, we must treat the individual as 
an end in itself. Although goodness and 
beauty are not the same, they must occasion-
ally be allies. Fo.r if either permanently 
13. Allport, Int. Jour. of Eth., 38 (1928), 387. 
14. Cf. Wright, Int. Jour. of Eth., 42 (1932). 265. 
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This thought reminds us of Aristotle's view of 
Katharsis, a detailed analysis of which is provided in an 
20 article by D. A. Barker. The experience in contemplating a 
tragic drama, Aristotle believed, had the effect of purging 
one from evils accumulated in the emotional stri~e of living. 
Barker identifies this with the experience of the mystic. 
In katharsis we escape from ourselves to a 
union, very imperfect and temporary perhaps, 
but still a union with some greater whole. 
• • • We are released from that individual-
ity which in the competitive world is of 
necessity our most treasured and most precious jewel, and we are enabled to fini new joy in 
union. That joy is not only calm but also a 
heightened sensitivity. By so losing our-
selves we live, not less, but more intensely.21 
The writers of these articles recognize two chief 
dangers to aesthetic values. One of these, the effort to 
transform art into propaganda, we have already mentioned. The 
other takes the form of bitter opposition on the part of a 
group of social workers and sympathizers who emphasize the need 
of raising the economic and social standard of the lower class-
es to the exclusion of all else. Their viewpoint is well ex-
pressed by Vivas: 
In a world so pitifully in need of reform, 
where men live such miserable lives, either 
materially or spiritually, to speak of art's 
intrinsic satisfaction seems to morally earnest 
souls no better than fiddle-faddle unwor~hy of 
anyone who calls himself a man.22 
II 20. Barker, Int. Jour. of Eth., 42 (1932), 419-433. 
21. Ibid.' 433. 
22. Vivas, loc. cit., 85. · 
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b. Philosop.hy of Religion. 
The chief relation of ethics to the philosophy of 
I religion, as to aesthetics, lies in the moral obligation to 
include the greatest possible number of values, and this 
necessarily includes religious values. Being among the high-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
est of all. values, those of religion are by no means the easiest I 
to realize. As Joseph R. Geiger2~oints out, the achieving 
of religious values deman.ds constant.' . exercise of the will to 
know. The seeker after such values is likely to find the way 
i 
of traditional symbolism inadequate, and to be :f~.&e·:.ec?L with the 
necessity of treading the unfamiliar path of the religious 
pioneer. The spirit of eunosi ty and adventure combined with 
a measure of reverence · is what is here needed. Thus ""the 
faith of the religionist may have back of it something of the 
passion for reality that is characteristic of science and 
philosophy at their best. u27 
·Edward Scribner Ames sees the religion of today 
functioning in promoting moral principles. "Religion, u he 
says, 'tis the dramatization on a cosmic scale o·f the moral 
and spiritual warfare of man struggling to possess his sou1.u 28 
By translating moral judgtnents into forms of 
art, through public rituals, and by dramatiz-
ing these judgments by means of impressive 
and appealing personalities, religion makes 
them appreciable for those who could not grasp 29 them in their theoretical, critical formulation. 
I 26. I . 
l
i 27. 
I 28. 
li 29. 
Geiger, Int. Jour. of Eth., 42 (1932), 193. 
Ibid.' 199. 
Ames, Int. Jour. of Eth., 38 (1928), 305. 
Ibid.' 304. 
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1 di:fficulty';; ,~"providing him with a better orientation •. If the 
severe nature of the situation has for the time being paralyzed 
his faculties, keeping him from taking the necessary action, 
11 prayer may prove the means of releasing his best powers. 
At its best prayer brings out the best that is in a person, 
for he is compelled to face the situation frankly, to be honest 
with himself, before he can present his problem and petition 
to his God. In prayer, then, we have the example of a spec-
ific factor in religious value contributing to the solution 
of problems in the moral realm. 
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Turning to further material on this subject, we find Chambers 
saying that metaphysical detenninismnis not the enemy but the 
ally and handmaiden of freedom. • • • Belief in determinism 
implies freedom no less than freedom implies determinism. n4 
Chambers, McGilvary and other writers on this subject agree 
that the question of moral freedom in as far as it transcends 
the psychological concerns the nature of the individual's 
conscious choices between determined alternatives. Are these 
choices themselves determined, or are they free? We have 
already observed McGilvar.y's answer that they are determined 
by the factors of heredity and environment. This he clatmed 
did not affect the validity of moral responsibility.5 Not 
in indeterminism but in self determinism, declares Chambers, 
we should seek our solution to this problem. Metaphysical 
I freedom is realized in the creative activity of God and man. 
1 The unpredictable character of emergent evolution points in 
'I 
I 
-_:_ ____ =t 
this direction. 
If, then, emergent evolution be true, or at 
least a step in the direction of truth, it 
would seem to lend countenance to the idea 
••• that where nature is still creative, 
that is, at the apex where man stands, there 
is freedom, but supported on a substructure 
of habit and determinism.6 
Though she does not emphasize emergence, Susanne K. Langer 
agrees that the factor of unpredictability has an important 
4. Chambers, Int. Jour. of Eth. ·, 42 (1932), 170. 
5. McGilvary, Int. Jour. of Eth., 45 (1935), 379-398. 
6. Chambers, loc. -cit., 185. 
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democracy, one on communism, and one on f'asc ism. It is 
unfortunate that the first is the weakest of the three. Its 
virtue lies chiefly in its being the better of Smith's two 
articles on democracy. In this treatment Smi.th goes through 
the conventional procedure of discussing the ambiguous and 
contradictory nature of the basic concepts, - liberty, 
equality, and fraternity. Though it contains a clear state-
ment of' the issues at stake and the problems involved, no real 
solution is suggested and the conclusion is not especially 
striking. 
It seems certain ••• that unless . liberty 
can through equality get generalized into 
fraternity, democracy is not. the final formula-
tion for the aspiration of the human spirit. 
If it is the final formulation, the basic 
problem that faces social engineering -and it 
is an engineering task, for the ethical ends 
are available -is whether work can be so 
humanized or human nature so changed that men 
may yet work co-operatively for the joy of 
working, making at once a living for each 
other and a life for all through the humane 
distribution of the goods produced. That 
men will live for private gain we know; that 
they will die for public ends we know; but 
whether average men in the continuous long 
run wi.ll work e~fici ently for public ends 
we do not know. 2 
In his article on communism Smith continues to trace I 
the motives which will cause men to work. On the side of' i 
Russian economic planning is the conviction expressed by the 
greatest religious prophets and poets of the past that "man 
ought not to be, and so need not be, determined by motives 
22. Smith, Int. Jour. of Eth., 39 (1928), 14. 
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of' private advantage. tt Likewise the greatest scientists 
by the unselfish and unacquisitive spirit of' their efforts 
tend to demonstrate the possibility "that men can and will 
live for ·other than pecuniary ends •1 .. 24 The spirit of leading 
scientists pervades the entire class of professional men, 
with the result that this group is far less affected by the 
profit motive than is the business man. The hope of the 
communist lies in instilling this spirit into workers in 
every field. Still another evidence in favor of the possibil-
ity of socializing human motivation is supplied by such psych-
ologists as Watson and such philosophers as Dewey, who hold 
that for human personality "the social medium provides the 
conditioning technique ."25 In favor of then~ommunist ~ tlien is 
his whole-hearted acceptance of the prin- . 
ciple of soul-growing through socially con- · 
ditioned responsibility, his program of 
planned production, his courage to submit 
his program to the test of' practice, and his 
probable success in spite of our traditional 
belief that men will not continuously work 
save for private gain.26 
The fatal weakness of the communist in Smith's 
opinion lies in his conviction that he possesses final truth, 
his unwillingness to concede the possibility of anything bette 
than his present plan. "Communism is a dogma presupposing as 
23. Smith, Int. Jour. of Eth., 42 (1932), 115. 
24. Ibid., 117. 
25. Ibid., 119. 
26 • Ibid. , 121. 
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I. the condition of final success a static world. 1127 Certainly, 
whatever its faults, capitalism possesses a cosmology infinite-
ly superior to this. "Add to true cosmology correct motiva-
/ tion, and we shall through synthesis have transcended both 
J] communism and capitalism."28 After discussing the contradict-
1
/ ory character of the conununist's violent means, Smith lists 
I the lessons communism could well learn from capitalism as 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
belief in a growing world, an extension of 
intelligence from means to ends, and a 
recognition of the impossibility of an ade-
quate supply of intelligence save with toler-
ance of basic ideological variety and ap-
preciation of the joy and utility of 
intellectual freedom.29 
Though in many respects it is a clear analysis of 
I the situation, Smith's article has the defect of dwelling too 
i 
I 
I 
li 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
li 
II 
I 
I 
I 
exclusively on the contrasting economic systems of capitalism 
and communism with too little mention of the sharp contrast 
between the forms of government of Russia and the democratic 
countries. Democracy cannot in all respects be identified 
with capitalism, and his failure sufficiently to bring this 
out leads him into confusion. In what sense, for example, 
can capitalism correctly be said to possess a cosmology? 
Persons living in a capitalistic country hold a cosmology, 
but is it not likely that this is more colored by their 
~~ democratic government than by their capitalistic economics? 
II 
Jl 
II 
!I 
27~ Smith, loc. cit., -123. 
28. Ibid., 124. 
29. Ibid., 130. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
APPLICATION OF ETHICS. 
1. In Political Science. 
It remains to indicate briefly some of the more 
important applications of ethics to other fields of activity. 
Our preceding discussion of social philosophy provides a 
natural introduction to the subject of ethical applications 
in political science. In order to avoid overlapping, how-
ever, we shall discuss only a few of the more important 
political problems raised in the articles. The first of' 
these concerns the obligation imposed on the citizen of a 
democratic state. To what extent should he bow to the will 
of the majority as represented by the government? The idea 
that the majority decision is always right is absurd. Can it, 
therefore, be always right for the citizen to obey such a de-
cision? One of the strongest arguments for such obedience 
is that it will serve to maintain order. According to w. M. 
Ball, "in _the case of the state, obedience to a majority de-
cision is the essential condition of the maintenance of the 
best kind of order, that is, an order that is as nearly as 
possible self-imposed. 111 To a certain extent each case 
concerning obedience to the will of the majority must be 
considered on its individual merits with special reference 
to the probable consequences. The burden of proof of his 
1. Ball, Int. Jour. of Eth., 41 (1931), 300. 
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I right to disobey always rests on the dissenter. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Since majority government is the nearest 
approximation to self-government, there must 
be a very clear prospect of a great good to 
be gained before the risk of substituting 
minority rule is taken, for the lesson of 
history is that whenever a minority enjoys 
irresponsible power, it will sooner or later 
exploit its position to it.s own advantage.2 
The citizen •s obligatio.ns t .o his goverrm.ent naturally 
I raise.; the question of his duty in time of war. I This problem 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I• 
'I 
is discussed in some detail in an article by c. Delisle Burns? 
Perhaps his best statement i .s as follows: ttrf war is not con-
cerned with any moral issue at all, • • • there cannot be any 
moral duty to serve in war. If there is a moral duty, then 
4 the issue in war must itself be moral. n From this the author 
goes on to point out that such a question of right can never 
be decided by the use of force. Likewise the conduct of a 
war severely hampers the moral functions of the state. There-
fore he concludes that it i .s t.t·the moral duty of all citizens 
to work :for the abolition o.f war.tt:5 Unfortunately, however, 
he partially retracts this in the next paragraph by stating 
that citizens should be willing to serve in war or its prepar-
ation under the existing conditions. The reason lies in the 
:t. Ball. Int. Jour. of Eth., 41 (1931), 300. 
3. Burna, · Int. Jour. of Eth., 46 (1936), 411-428a 
4. Ibid., 418. 
5. Ibid., 419. 
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s. Gale Lowrie, after a rather exhaustive treatment of the 
disadvantages of national barriers to travel, to industry, 
to the taxpayer who bears the burden of national defense, -
after this list of defects in the system of separate nations 
he reaches the conclusion that the existence of the individual 
nation is worth the cost. 
Nationalism promotes and protects something 
dearer to. the heart of the people than the 
wealth whmch is wasted in the support of 
the system of independent states. Man does 
no~ live by bread alone.9 
The great enterprises of the world require 
group activityi and so long as men differ 
in their politJ.cal aspirations and purposes, 
they will find separate political organiza-
tion with different laws and policies best 
suited to their needs.lO 
2. In Economics. 
Of the several. articles dealing with ethics and 
economics the most comprehensive is that by Joseph J. Speng-
ler entitled nHave Values a P·lace in Economics?'"ll Here the 
subject specifically treated is whether the economist should 
deal with what ought to be in addition to what is. Those 
who feel that he should not base their contention on the un-
certain definition of the term welfare and on the possible 
destruction of the economist's efficiency through loss of 
his impersonal, detached perspective. In answer to the first 
9. Lowrie, Int. Jour. of Eth., 41 (1930), 48. 
10. Ibid., 49. 
11. Spengler, Int. Jour. of Eth., 44 (1934), 313-331. 
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''Business Ethics. 1116 Here the subject with which he deals 
is not so much whether moral values become an integral part 
of economics as those phases of ethics which have been 
specifically applied to the economic field. 
Certain ethical problems, such as those 
connected with price policies, unfair 
trade methods, and self-regulation in 
business, have developed out of the present 
structure of American business and the func-
tional relations arising therefrom.l7 
Professor Knight and Professor Ayres, though bitterly opposed 
to each other's general economic views, agree that moral value 
have a definite place i'n economic theory. According to Ayres, 
"the whole significance of a theory of social order is necess-
arily moral, since that is precisely what morality is. 1118 
Knight is chiefly concerned with values having to do with the 
principle of distribution, but his most interesting point 
is his view of economic liberty as an intrinsic value. 
After discussing the view of classical economics he remarks, 
There is another way of looking at the phil-
osophy of economic liberty as a whole. That 
is, instead of •rationalizing' liberty as 
a condition leading to maximum efficiency 
and/or growth, it may be looked at as a 
value in itself.l9 
16. Taeusch, Int. Jour. of Eth., 42 (1932), 273-288. 
17. Ibid., 284. 
---- . 
18. Ayres, Int. Jour. of Eth., 45 (1935), 198. 
19. Knight, Int. Jour. of Eth., 45 (1935), 206. 
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resume of present day political corruption, this writer goes 
on to question the factor of education as a remedy. His first 
\ attack is upon quan~ative methods in American education. 
The quantitative fallacy is rampant; more 
schools, more colleges, more pupils, more 
teachers, more books, more money, more 
subjects - and ultimately perhaps more chaos 
and more disillusion25 
As Orton points out, though the United States spends more 
money and induces its population to spend more years in 
education than any other country, yet the effect of this 
training on our culture has been extremely meager. The in-
ferior quality of the movie and the newspaper combined with 
the standard in terms of big business of what constitutes 
success have served to undermine the effects of the educational 
program. The product of American education is becoming, like 
that of the old Chinese system, "not ignorant, not illiterate, 
not unhappy; but replete, static, sterile. 1126 
The proclaiming of any one social institution as 
the supreme end for education involves dangerous consequences, 
and hence Orton is bitterly opposed to the phrase, 'Education 
for Democracy." Democracy in education is productive of 
mediocrity. 
The society that it produces develops in such 
a fashion that the need for leadership is 
automatically increased while the su~~ly is 
automatically reduced in proportion.27 
25. Orton, loc. cit., 172. 
26. Ibid., rzs. 
27. Ibid., 178.. 
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Yet if there is a solution for this situation, it is the 
educator alone who can provide it. 
To ask him, therefore, · to accept any given 
system of customs, tastes, and institutions 
as the end of his endeavors is to abrogate 
his whole possibility of service, and a 
treason to the state. For the intellectual, 
the moral, and the aesthetic conscience o.f 
the community is in his keeping; and the 
freedom he asks to grope for his own ends 
is also that which it is the highest interest 
of society to preserve for him.28 
While it contains much that is true, Ortonts treat-
ment goes too far in identifying the American status quo with 
the principle of democracy. Many of the abuses of which 
he complains belong to the accidents of this particular demo-
cratic order rather than to the essence of democracy itself. 
If it is true that a democratic government and educational 
system tend to produce mediocrity and to discourage leadership, 
what of totalitarian states in which individual development 
is so drastically restricted, where the knell of freedom has 
indeed rung? 
In a not too dissimilar vein from that of Orton, 
Roy F. Swift29condemns contemporary American education for 
its tendency toward ."shaping the child to fit some supposed 
static order. u30 His demand is for education designed to equip 
the child to face conditions within a changing environnent. 
28. Orton, lac. cit., 179. 
29. Swift, Yilt. Jour. of Eth., 39 (1929) ,. 325. 
30. Ibid. 
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The author who most comes to grips with the educational 
problem is, however, President RObert M. Hutchins31of the 
University of Chicago. Our current bewilderment and loss 
of direction he attributes to educational emphasis on the 
accumulation of facts without a knowledge of the basic 
rational principles by which such facts may be explained. 
In a return to these ultimate principles lies our hope for 
gaining direction -to guide our continued progress. Surely 
President Hutchins is correct, and objections such as tho»e 
of Charles E. Clark's protesting article32are, as Warren33 
shows, based chiefly on a misconception of Hutchins' aim 
and a dislike of some of the minor points of his program. 
31. Hutchins, Int. Jour. of Eth., 44 (1934), 175-184. 
32. Clark, Int. Jour. of Eth., 47 (1937), 317-335. 
33. Warren, Int. Jour. of Eth., 47 (1937}, 336-345. 
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